Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers by Lingxin Hao et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
GAMES PARENTS AND ADOLESCENTS PLAY:











This research was funded by a grant from the National Institute for Child Health and Human Development
(R01HD34293). We wish to thank Robert Pollak, David Levine and Hongbin Cai for their suggestions at the
initial stages of this research and to Gary Becker, Andrew Cherlin, Wilbert van der Klaauw, Tomas
Phillipson, Paul Schultz, Duncan Thomas, participants in workshops at UC-San Diego, UC-Santa Barbara,
Washington University, the NBER Summer Institute, George Mason University and the University of
Chicago for comments on an earlier draft of the paper Obviously, only the authors are responsible for the
content of this paper. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Lingxin Hao, V. Joseph Hotz, and Ginger Z. Jin.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source.Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic
Transfers
Lingxin Hao, V. Joseph Hotz, and Ginger Z. Jin




This paper examines reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. We consider parental
reputation in a repeated two-stage game in which adolescents decide whether to give a teen birth or
drop out of high school, and given adolescent decisions, the parent decides whether to house and
support his children beyond age 18. Drawing on the work of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps
and Wilson (1982), we show that the parent has, under certain conditions, the incentive to penalize
older children for their teenage risky behaviors in order to dissuade the younger children from the
same risky behaviors. The model generates two empirical implications: the likelihood of teen risky
behaviors and parental transfers to a child who engaged in teen risky behaviors will decrease with
the number of remaining children at risk. We test these two implications, using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79). Exploiting the availability of
repeated observations on individual respondents and of observations on multiple siblings, we find
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1.  Introduction 
  A significant percentage of adolescents engage in risky behaviors. For example, among 
U.S. students enrolled in grades 9-12 in 2001, 47.1% drank alcohol, 23.9% used marijuana, and 
45.6% had had sexual intercourse at least once in their lives.
1 Some of these behaviors represent 
experimentation during the transition from youth to adulthood, but authorities are concerned that 
some behaviors are excessive and may have harmful long-run consequences. Take unprotected 
sex as an example: it results in about 3 million new cases of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) 
each year,
2 implying substantial medical and public health costs.
3 Unprotected sex and/or use of 
ineffective contraceptive methods also led to 453,725 births to women under the age of 20 in 
2001
4, of which 79% were out-of-wedlock. Numerous studies suggest that early childbearing is 
associated with adverse consequences for both teen mothers and her children.
5 Aware of these 
long run consequences, the public strongly supports the statement that teenagers “should abstain 
from sex at least until they are out of high school.”
6 
  Why do adolescents engage in risk-taking behaviors even if the society as a whole disap-
proves these behaviors? Answer to this question is important for understanding the causes of 
adolescent risky behaviors hence identifying effective methods to curb these behaviors. To ad-
                                                 
1 Tabulations from the 2001 Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS). Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
2 Eng and Butler (1997).  
3 Chesson, et al. (2004) estimate that the direct medical costs of the 9 million new cases of STDs that occurred 
among adolescents and young adults in the U.S. in 2001 cost $6.5 billion.  
4 Child Trends (2003).  
5 For example, women who bear children as teenagers are subsequently less likely to complete high school, less 
likely to participate in the labor force, more likely to have low earnings, and less likely to marry than are women 
who do not have children as teenagers. As a result, adolescent mothers and their children are likely to spend a sub-
stantial fraction of their lifetimes in poverty (see Upchurch and McCarthy 1990).  
6 Annie E. Casey Foundation (1999).   2
dress this question, most researchers focus on either the adolescents’ decision-making process,
7 
or external forces such as peer groups, mass media, school education, community organizations, 
and social policies. In comparison, the role of parents receives much less attention, though par-
ents “have the legal authority to control their children’s behavior and social lives.”
8 Filling in 
this gap, this paper develops a new theory about the intra-familial interaction between parents 
and adolescent children, and provides empirical evidence in support of the theory. As detailed in 
the next section, we believe the paper has explored a new branch in the economics literature, 
complementary to both the Rotten Kid’s Theorem (Becker 1974, 1991) and the classic theory of 
unitary decision within a family (Becker 1964). 
  Consider an altruistic parent and a selfish teenage child in a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, the adolescent decides whether to engage in risky behaviors. In the second stage, the par-
ent decides whether to punish such behaviors by withholding resources to the child. As 
Bergstrom (1989) points out, this game may not reach a desirable outcome (i.e. no risky behav-
iors) as the Rotten Kid Theorem predicts, if the parent’s utility function is non-transferable. In 
that case, the parent cares about the child so much that he could not withhold the transfers from 
an ill-behaving child. The child foresees the parent’s inability to commit punishment and there-
fore undertakes the risky behavior more than the parent would have her choose. Such equilib-
rium implies that the parent has little control over adolescent behaviors.  
  This paper is more optimistic about parental control. We argue that a parent with non-
transferable utility is able to exploit children’s uncertainty about parental preferences and resume 
controls on some of his adolescent children. Specifically, we model parent-adolescent actions as 
a repeated game. Each round of the game has the same two stage structure as described above, 
                                                 
7 O’Donoghue and Robin (2001).    3
characterizing the parent’s interaction with one of his children who has reached adolescence. 
Each child plays the game once by birth order whereas the parent plays through all the rounds. 
Initially, children are uncertain of parental preferences being transferable or non-transferable, but 
younger children learn from older siblings’ experience. Drawing on the reputation model of Mil-
grom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that parents have incentives to 
penalize older children for their risky behaviors in order to dissuade the younger ones from the 
same risky behavior. 
  This reputation model yields two empirical implications. First, parents should be more 
willing to punish their first-borne children who engage in risky behaviors in order to influence 
the actions of their later-born children, if they have more than one child. Second, to the extent 
that such reputations can be credibly established, the first-born children are less likely to engage 
in risky behaviors as teens. In essence, the reputation model implies that risk-taking on the part 
of their adolescent offspring and parental responses to such behaviors vary systematically by 
birth order. 
  Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79), we analyze 
the outcomes of two types of risky behaviors among adolescents—teenage childbearing, and 
high school dropping out. Both behaviors appear to have long-term negative consequences. 
Teenage mothers are less successful in the labor and marriage markets
9 and are more likely to 
expose their children to poverty later in life than women who do not have teen births.
10 Simi-
                                                                                                                                                             
8 American Bar Association (1996), p. 5-7.  
9 While the evidence on the long-term consequences of teenage childbearing are controversial—see Hotz, McElroy 
and Sanders (2004) for example—such women do experience reductions in earnings and marriages prospects early 
in their adult lives.  
10 While giving up births for adoption might mitigate some of these adverse consequences, most teen mothers do not 
do so. Between 1989 and 1995, for example, less than 1% of all babies born to never-married women in the U.S 
were relinquished for adoption. See Chandra, et al. (1999).    4
larly, most children who drop out of school for at least a year do not end up ever receiving a 
regular high school diploma and, as Cameron and Heckman (1993) find, high school dropouts 
have significantly lower earnings than do those who complete high school.
11 
  Consistent with the reputation model, we find that respondents who have committed 
teenage childbearing or high school dropout as teenagers receive fewer parental transfers after 
age 18 when there are still siblings younger than age 18. Moreover, focusing on respondents 
from the same families, we find that older siblings are less likely than younger ones to drop out 
of high school or to have teenage childbearing. This supports the argument that older children 
foresee greater parental incentives to punish them for risky behaviors and therefore refrain from 
committing risky behaviors.  
  Alternatively, low-income parents may have fewer resources to transfer to older children 
if they need to support a large number of children under age 18. Older children, in expectation of 
the resource dilution, are less likely to engage in risky behavior. This alternative explanation 
yields the same predictions as our reputation model. We empirically test both and find that the 
reputation model is far more powerful than the resource dilution story in explaining the empirical 
data.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews multi-disciplinary 
literature on risky behavior and positions our reputation model in the economic literature of in-
tra-familial interactions. Section 3 characterizes the repeated two-stage game of a parent and his 
adolescent children, and spells out each player’s equilibrium strategy. Section 4 outlines the em-
pirical implications, specifies the econometrics model, and discusses a range of issues that may 
compromise our ability to test the implications. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents 
                                                 
11 Some high school dropouts do end up obtaining a GED, but as Cameron and Heckman (1993) also find, such cer-
tificates are not equivalent to receipt of high school diplomas in terms of lifetime earnings or employment.   5
the empirical estimates and examines alternative explanations. The last section offers concluding 
remarks. 
2.  Literature Review 
  Teenage risky behaviors have attracted attention from a number of academic disciplines. 
In one strand of the literature, psychologists and behavioral economists analyzed adolescent de-
cision-making process, linking risky behavior to teenagers’ myopic view of the present and mis-
prediction of the future (O’Donoghue and Robin 2001). In another strand, researchers associate 
teenage risky behaviors with external influences. Some emphasize extra-familial forces such as 
peer groups, mass media, school education, community organizations, and social policies;
12 oth-
ers examine parental control within the family.  
  The study on parent control can be further classified into two branches: psychologists and 
sociologists stipulate that parents foster children’s internalization of social values through model-
ing, reinforcing and punishing (Baumrind 1978; McLanahan 1985)
13, while economists focus on 
utilizing economic incentives to mitigate the interest conflict between parents and children. Here 
we focus on the economics literature. Since the reputation model boils down to birth-order ef-
fects in the empirical tests, we draw special attention to the implication of birth-order effects in 
the existing theories. 
                                                 
12 Some economists have focused on the responsiveness of adolescent risky behaviors to market-based and public 
policy incentives, such as prices, taxes, regulations and other governmental and public efforts to curb such behav-
iors. See Gruber (2001), Chaloupka and Grossman (1996), and Evans and Huang (1997) on the effects of taxes and 
other policies on youth smoking; Dee and Evans (2001) on the effects of speed limits and safety belt laws on teen 
traffic safety; Levine (2001) on the effects of costs of becoming pregnant on the sexual activity and contraceptive 
practices of teens; Cook and Moore (2001) on the effects of excise taxes on teenage drinking; Card and Lemieux 
(2001) on the effects of tuition costs and labor market conditions on the dropout and enrollment trends for youth in 
the U.S. 
13 Empirical findings are mixed. For example, some found that non-intact families and unstable families prevent 
parents from fulfilling their role and have negative consequences for children (Sampson and Laub 1993; Amato and 
Booth 1997) whereas others found little effect of non-intact families on children’s outcomes (Wu and Martinson 
1993; Harris 1998).   6
  Economists hold two views of familial decisions: some take the family as an efficient unit 
maximizing the whole family’s welfare and pay little attention to the conflict of interests within 
family members (Becker 1964). Such unitary model is useful explaining many familial decisions, 
but it contradicts the fact that parents disapprove teenage risky behaviors. Apparently, parents 
and their adolescent children have conflicting preferences towards risky behaviors, and such con-
flict is not completely solved within family.
14  
  The concern of intra-familial conflicts motivates the second view of familial decisions. In 
a seminal work, Gary Becker considered a two-stage game between an altruistic parent and a 
selfish child (Becker 1974, 1991). In the first stage, the child decides whether to take an action. 
In the second stage, the parent decides whether to punish such action by withholding resources to 
the child. Becker argued that the parent could use financial transfers to induce the child to take 
an action that maximizes the total well being of the family, even though the parent cannot di-
rectly control the child’s behavior. This is known as the Rotten Kid’s Theorem. 
  Subsequent works question the validity of the Rotten Kid Theorem.
15 For example, 
Bergstrom (1989) proves that the Rotten Kid Theorem requires the preferences of family mem-
bers fall within the class of transferable utility. Under transferable utility, the parent can always 
withhold enough resources from a wrongdoing child so that the withheld resources fully com-
pensate the discomfort resulting from the child’s misbehavior. We label such parent “unforgiv-
ing.” If the utility is non-transferable, the parent may care about the child’s welfare so much that 
he could not stand seeing the child suffer from the withheld resources. Such parent would help 
the wrongdoing child ex post, even though he fully realizes the adverse long-run consequences 
                                                 
14 Economists also develop a collective model in which the family is assumed to reach parent-efficient outcomes 
(Chiappori 1988, 1992). Obviously, the collective model is subject to the same criticism in our context.  
15 See Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), Bruce and Waldman (1990), Bergstrom (1989), and the Foreword to the enlarged 
edition of Becker’s Treatise on the Family.   7
of the misbehavior and would like the child to avoid it ex ante. We name this type of parent “for-
giving.” Since the forgiving parent cannot make a credible commitment to punish an ill-behaving 
child, the adolescent child would undertake risky behaviors more than the parent desires.  
  The distinction of forgiving and unforgiving parents is better exhibited in a game theoretic 
framework. Consider Case 1 in Figure 1 where the parent is unforgiving so that his payoff is –1 if 
he withholds transfer from the teenage child who engages in a risky behavior and –2 if he ac-
commodates the misbehaving child. Knowing that the parent is unforgiving and always punishes 
risk-taking behavior, the adolescent child will choose not to engage in such behavior because the 
utility of “risky action, parent punishes” is lower than that of “no risky action, parent supports.” 
As a result, the final equilibrium—“no risky action, parent supports”—is Pareto optimal. Now 
consider case 2 with a forgiving parent. After the child engages in a risky behavior, the parent is 
more willing to accommodate the child (earning utility 0.5) than to punish her (earning utility –1). 
Knowing that the forgiving parent will always acquiesce, the child will misbehave, given that she 
obtains utility 2 for engaging in “risky action” and 1 for “no risky action.” In this case, the adoles-
cent manipulates the forgiving parent to accept a sub-optimal equilibrium—“risky action, parent 
acquiesce”—although the parent would prefer “no risky action” ex ante. Note that, no matter the 
parent is forgiving or unforgiving, Becker’s model applies to every child in the same family thus 
implying no birth-order effects.  
  One possible extension is to subject Becker’s model to financial constraints. Assuming 
transferable utility (i.e. unforgiving parents), Weinberg (2001) argued that parents’ ability to 
control children behavior via pecuniary incentives is limited at low incomes, leading to increased 
reliance on non-pecuniary mechanisms such as corporal punishment. The financial constraint 
may give rise to a birth-order effect. Specifically, older children may have access to fewer re-  8
sources than later-born children in the same family, because they have to share the resources 
with younger siblings. If this is true, the Weinberg model implies that low-income parents have 
more resources per capita to construct pecuniary incentives for the younger children and there-
fore younger children should behave better than their older siblings.  
  The implication of birth-order effects would be reversed if we impose financial constraints 
on forgiving parents. In a family facing resource dilution, parents may be equally forgiving for 
every child’s risk-taking behavior but they are tied up in resources to help out the older children. 
In equilibrium, older children expect the resource shortage ex ante and therefore are less likely to 
engage in risky behaviors. This birth-order effect is similar to that from the reputation model. 
However, the logic only applies to the low-income families, because rich families, by definition, 
have enough resources to help each wrongdoing children regardless of birth order.  
  Instead of imposing financial constraints, this paper extends the Becker model in two new 
dimensions. First, rather than focusing on the one-parent-one-child interaction, we set up a dy-
namic intra-familial model where one parent and multiple children engage in a repetition of the 
Becker’s game. Each child plays the two-stage game once by birth order whereas the parent 
plays through all rounds. Second, we relax the assumption of perfect information. Becker’s 
model assumes that the child knows whether the parent is forgiving or unforgiving. If every 
player’s preference is publicly known, by backward deduction, the dynamic model implies the 
same static outcome every round. However, if the children are uncertain about the parent’s type 
(forgiving or unforgiving), a forgiving parent may utilize the information asymmetry to improve 
his control over adolescent children.  
  Given the once-for-all nature of some risk-taking actions and the inherent problems of 
parents providing credible signals about their net preferences over such actions, children are   9
likely to be uncertain as to exactly how their parents feel about such behaviors and exactly how 
they will respond to them. Over time, younger children can learn that from the experience of 
older siblings, which entails a reputation concern on the parent’s side. Drawing on the reputation 
model of Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that the parent 
has incentive to penalize older children for their risky behaviors in order to dissuade the younger 
ones from the same risky behavior. Such birth-order effects are conditional on the occurrence of 
adolescent risky behaviors, and may appear in all families with multiple children. These predic-
tions allow us to distinguish the reputation model from the existing theories mentioned above.  
  To summarize, this paper intends to make two contributions to the literature. In the con-
text of adolescent risky behaviors, the existing economic theories posit the family’s role in two 
extremes. At one extreme, a family solves all the intra-familial conflicts (via the unitary model or 
the Rotten Kid’s Theorem). At the other extreme, a forgiving parent is subject to the manipula-
tion of his adolescent children and has no control over adolescent behaviors. These two extremes 
imply either no need for social policies regarding adolescent risky behaviors or a complete reli-
ance on the social policy in curbing risky behaviors. In contrast, the reputation model allows a 
middle ground between the two extremes by examining the condition under which the parent has 
the ability to control adolescent children. Our work and hopefully future research along the same 
line would help policymakers better understand the role of parents and therefore design better 
social policies that complement parental efforts in curbing risk-taking behaviors among adoles-
cents. This is our main contribution to the literature.  
  Our second contribution relates to the birth-order effects. A number of sociologists and 
psychologists document birth-order effects, but they do not specify the underlying mechanism. 
Not only do we provide a framework for a new kind of birth-order effects, we also articulate the   10
mechanism through which adolescent behavior and parental response give rise to such birth-
order effects. We hope our work will deepen the understanding about the impact of birth orders.  
3.  The Reputation Model 
  Consider a family of one parent and N children. The whole game consists of N rounds, 
each involving the parent and one child at adolescence by birth order. Each round is a standard 
Becker’s model: in the first stage, an adolescent child decides whether to engage in some risky 
behavior. After observing the adolescent’s choice, the parent decides whether to provide or with-
hold financial transfers to the child. The case of most interest is when the parent and the children 
do not agree about the utility of the adolescent behavior. 
  More precisely, in each round of the game, the child is selfish and maximizes his/her util-
ity Uc(cc,b) over own behavior b and own consumption cc. The behavior takes two values: b = 1 
if the child engages in the risky behavior and b = 0 if no risky behavior. The parent is altruistic 
and has two personalities: as a consumer, the parent derives utility Up(cp,b) from his own con-
sumption cp and the child’s behavior b; as a social planner, the parent cares about the family’s 
welfare Wp(Up(cp,b),Uc(cc,b)). In each round of the game, the parent has an exogenously given 
income Ip to support his own consumption and that of the child via financial transfers t. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the adolescent has no income and totally depends on parental transfer to 
support consumption. Thus the utility functions can be rewritten as Uc(t,b) and Wp(Up(Ip-t,b), 
Uc(t,b)). For simplicity, we assume the transfer takes two values: t = 1 if the parent gives finan-
cial transfer to the child and t = 0 if the parent withholds the transfer. We also assume, from the 
planner-parent’s standpoint, that both the consumer-parent’s utility and the child’s utility are 
normal goods and that Wp has nice concavity to guarantee a unique solution to this game. 
  The parent may be one of the two types: forgiving or unforgiving. At the beginning of the   11
dynamic game, children do not know the parent’s type.
16 We label a child as the k
th child if she 
has k - 1 younger siblings. By this notation, the first born is Child N, and the last-born is Child 1. 
While uncertain about the parent’s preferences, the first-born starts with a prior belief that the 
parent is forgiving with probability πN. We do not specify exactly how these priors are formed, 
although it is reasonable to presume that they are influenced by the past interactions of children 
with their parent and from observing the parent-adolescent interactions in other families in one’s 
neighborhood or extended family or social class. As the game moves on, Child k observes all the 
actions of older siblings and may update this belief to πk when she enters adolescence. 
  Given the uncertainty, Child k chooses her action based on πk and the expected parental 
response to her action. Since the parent plays throughout the whole game, he chooses a sequence 
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where δ is the publicly known discount factor. The parent’s choice of financial transfer in round 
k is conditional on Child k’s behavior and the updated belief πk. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
exists if at any point of the game, (i) a player’s strategy prescribe optimal actions from that point 
on given her opponents’ strategy and the relevant belief, and (ii) the belief is consistent with the 
strategies being played.
17  
Following Kreps and Wilson (1982)18, we define a sequence of belief thresholds {} k π , 
                                                 
16 Examining the consequences of other forms of uncertainty in parent-children interactions is also of potential inter-
est. For example, it is possible that parents are uncertain about their children’s true preferences over risky actions. 
Another interesting source of uncertainty is the possibility that parents are unable to observe directly whether their 
children engage in risky behaviors, e.g., whether they smoke, drink alcohol, or use drugs. Allowing for the latter 
type of uncertainty is a focus of our future work on parental responses to adolescent risk taking.  
17 Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), page 283-285.  
18 The setting is a strict translation from the original model in Kreps and Wilson (1982), which specified and proved 
the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The model is robust if we assume the parent’s type to be continuous from com-  12
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The numerator in the first expression represents the maximum cost for a child engaging in the 
risky behavior, while the denominator denotes the benefits of taking the risky action and obtain-
ing parental support. Therefore,  1 π  represents the “cost-benefit” ratio that makes a child indiffer-
ent between engaging in the risky behavior in the static Becker’s model. If the youngest child be-
lieves her parents’ preferences are more lenient than  1 π , she will engage in the risky behavior 
because the “benefits” of this action overweigh the “costs.” As one moves up the birth order 
from the youngest to the oldest, there is more reputation gain for a forgiving parent to punish the 
risky behavior. As a result, for Child k to optimally choose the risky action, she must believe that 
her parent is forgiving with a probability as high as  k π . Apparently,  k π  increases with k. 
  Assuming that the parent is sufficiently patient, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the 
N-child family can be described in three regimes.  
  Suppose the prior of the first-born child, πN, lies between  * k π  and  *1 k π + . Regime 1 con-
sists of all children older than Child k
*. In Regime 1, the reputation gain is so great that the par-
ent, with probability one, will punish all children that engage in a risky behavior. Given this pun-
ishment policy, all children in Regime 1 avoid the risky behavior. Since no risky behavior occurs 
in Regime 1, the children’s belief about their parent’s type remains equal to πN. Obviously, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
plete forgivingness to complete unforgiving ness. See the working paper version of this paper for this extension, and 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) for the same extension of the original Kreps and Wilson model.    13
more likely the children believe the parent to be unforgiving (i.e. the smaller the πN), the more 
children fall into Regime 1, and therefore the more children the parent can successfully deter 
from adolescent risky behaviors.  
  Starting from Child k
*, the gain from reputation reduces to a level that entails the parent 
to adopt a randomized strategy. In particular, the parent chooses to punish the k
th child (k < k
*) 




















* represent the first round in which the parent acquiesces to the child’s engagement in the 
risky behavior (by definition n
* < k
*). For Child n
*, the parent reveals his type to be “forgiving.” 
Define the interval n
* ≤ k ≤ k
* as Regime 2 and k < n
* as Regime 3. In Regime 2, although the 
parent employs a randomized punishment strategy, the actually observed transfers are all t = 0 to 
any ill-behaving child. Mimicking the parent’s strategy, the k
th child in Regime 2 follows a ran-
domized strategy, trying to avoid the risky behavior with probability greater than or equal to 
1. k π −  Finally in Regime 3, the parent’s type is no longer uncertain and the equilibrium reduces 
to the static game equilibrium, i.e., “Risky Action, Parents Acquiesce” outcome, 
* kn ∀< . 
  The three-regime equilibrium only holds when the parent is patient enough
19. Kreps and 
Wilson (1982) showed that as δ becomes sufficiently small, only Regime 3 exists in the equilib-
rium. In that case, the forgiving parent lacks an incentive to establish a reputation for punishing 
                                                 
19 Technically, the above equilibrium is a unique sequential equilibrium for the finitely repeated dynamic game. The 
equilibrium is also robust to two-side uncertainty; that is, the child may have private information about a preference 
toward teenage risky behaviors. In that case, parental strategy is exactly the same as before, as long as every child’s 
preference conforms to a publicly known distribution and every child’s preference is independent from each other. 
(Otherwise, the parent may learn the child’s preference throughout the game, which would substantially complicate 
the game structure.) Children’s strategy would take into account his/her own preference, which may explain why not 
every youngest child engages in risky behaviors and not every older child in a big family avoid risky behaviors. 
   14
the risky behavior of any child, since the discounted benefits of obtaining greater conformity by 
younger children in the future is always exceeded by the costs of punishing older children. In the 
empirical analysis presented below, we propose a way of detecting the impacts of such discount-
ing of future payoffs by parents. 
4.  Testable Implications and Econometric Specifications 
4.1  Testing the Reputation model 
  It is tempting to test the reputation model in its full structure: specify the prior belief πN 
as a function of parent, family and neighborhood characteristics; model each player’s choice set; 
solve for the optimal choice out of the choice set; and update the belief by the Bayes’ rule given 
all the behaviors undertaken by the older siblings and all the parental responses to these behav-
iors.  
  In reality, the structural model is difficult to implement because we do not observe the 
complete behavior-transfer history within a family. This generates two technical difficulties: 
first, it is hard to construct the prior belief. Although the NLSY79 contains the full fertility his-
tory of the family, we do not know what happened to older children not included in the sample. 
In the structural model, these children’s past behaviors and the parent’s response to these behav-
iors shall enter the prior belief. Second, parents in the real world may respond to adolescent be-
haviors in many ways and throughout many periods. For instance, parents may carry out non-
financial punishment before age 18 (since they have legal responsibilities to financially support 
children before age 18) and financial punishment after age 18. Unfortunately, NLSY79 does not 
contain information about non-financial punishment, which hinders our ability to estimate the 
belief update upon all the parental responses.  
  Given these difficulties, we test the reputation model in a reduced form. Specifically, we   15
take the financial transfers that parents give to children after age 18 as one type of parental re-
sponse to the children’s adolescent behavior. Since the timing of these financial transfers is not 
immediately after the occurrence of the adolescent behavior, we cannot estimate how these trans-
fers feed back to younger children in terms of belief update. Rather, we use these transfers to 
capture the way in which parental responses differ by birth order.  
  The reputation model predicts that, in regime 1, the parent punishes every risk-taking 
children with probability one; in regime 2, although the parent will punish risky behaviors with a 
probability less than one, the actual outcomes are all punishment until the first parental accom-
modation triggers regime 3; in regime 3, the parent reveals himself being forgiving and therefore 
never punishes the children for undertaking risky behaviors. This suggests that forgiving parents, 
in face of children’s uncertain about parents’ preference types, are more likely to punish older 
children for engaging in risky behaviors because the benefits of punishment increases with the 
number of younger siblings remaining under age 18 at the point of decision. Moreover, if the 
reputation benefit depreciates over time, the discounted benefits would be lower if there is a 
greater age gap between the child at question and the next younger sibling at risk.  
  Based on these predictions, we consider the following specification: 
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Bij = 1   if child i in family j has engaged in a risky action during teen age,  
Tijt = 1   if parent j provides financial transfers to child i at time t (after i reaches age 18) 
*
ijt T  =   index function of  ijt T    16
NYGijt =   number of younger siblings under age 18 at time t 
AGAPijt =  the age gap between the respondent and the next younger sibling that is under age 
18 at time t 
(,)
cp
ijt ijt f zz = a flexible function of child characteristics 
c
ijt z  and parent characteristics 
p
ijt z . 
The reputation model implies that α4 < 0 and α5 > 0. At issue is the endogeniety of Bij. 
Child i ‘s adolescent risky behavior depends on the belief she had about the parent type when she 
came to adolescence, which in turn depends on the characteristics of child i and family j at that 
time. Due to the dynamic nature of the game, parental transfer depends on that belief as well, 
generating an endogeneity problem. Although it is difficult to specify the belief update in a full 
structural model, this problem can be easily solved by including a child-specific fixed effect αij.  
  To see this, recall that we examine parental transfers after the child reaches age 18. At 
that point, the child’s adolescent behavior is predetermined and never changes over time. For the 
same reason, the belief preceding the adolescent behavior and whatever personal or family pref-
erences that drive the behavior at the child’s teen age are also predetermined. These predeter-
mined factors are fully absorbed in the child-specific fixed effect, αij, helping solve the endoge-
neity problem of Bij. Though we cannot estimate the coefficient of Bij separately from the indi-
vidual fixed effects, it does not hamper our ability to examine the interaction terms of Bij·NYGijt 
and Bij·AGAPijt and to test the reputation model. More specifically, with individual fixed effects, 
we test whether parents transfer more to the same ill-behaving adult child as more and more 
younger children grow older than age 18.  
  The reputation model also produces a strong birth-order effect in children’s adolescent 
behavior. Since the parent’s incentive of building a reputation of “being tough” is stronger for 
the older children, older children foreseeing such reputation incentives should behave better than   17
the younger children. Similarly, the closer is the age gap, the stronger is the reputation effect and 
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ij B  is the index function of Bij. The reputation model predicts that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0. 
Note that the prediction of older children behaving better than the younger children de-
rives from the three-regime feature of the dynamic equilibrium. Given the initial belief πN, chil-
dren in regime 1 never engage in risky behavior, children in regime 2 undertake the risky behav-
ior with a probability positive but less than one, and children in regime 3 knows the parent is 
forgiving and engage in the risky behavior with certainty. An empirical test of this prediction 
does not need to specify the children’s belief at each decision point, as long as the children under 
study are subject to the same initial belief πN.  
  We control for πN by family fixed effects βj. In fact, βj not only absorbs the initial belief 
πN of family j but also account for whatever family and neighborhood characteristics that may af-
fect the formation of πN. We would like to draw attention to two of such factors. First, βj includes 
all the fertility preference of family j if family j had completed all the childbirths before the first 
wave of NLSY79. This is true for most observations, and ruling out the few families whose 
number of children has changed during the years of NLSY79 does not affect any conclusion of 
this study. Second, some older children of family j may fall out of the interview frame of 
NLSY79. These children’s adolescent behaviors and parental response to these behaviors help 
define the prior belief for the first child included in the NLSY79. All these information are pre-
determined, thus fully absorbed in the family fixed effect, βj.    18
  While the use of fixed-effects estimators deals with all of the sources of bias that could 
arise in the given specifications, they may not be robust to certain generalizations of the reputa-
tion model. For example, parents may alter their preferences concerning their children engaging 
in risky behaviors, as they learn the consequences of such risky behaviors from the experiences 
with their older children. Similarly, due to imperfect financial markets, parents’ and adult chil-
dren’s disposable incomes may follow a life-cycle pattern rather than remain constant as the 
reputation model assumes. Under either of these generalizations, our estimates of reputation ef-
fects might be biased. In an attempt to minimize these potential sources of bias, we control for an 
extensive set of observable time-varying parental and child-specific characteristics. For example, 
we include parental age in both equations in order to proxy for the influence of time-varying fac-
tors determining parental income and/or the evolution of parental tastes. We also include child’s 
age and other time-varying child-specific characteristics in our specifications. Section 6 specifies 
a complete list of these variables.  
4.2  Alternative explanations 
  The reputation model is not the only source of birth-order effects. Birth-order effects may 
arise if resources per capita vary systematically by birth order. For example, a typical life-cycle 
earning profile suggests that parents may earn more when their younger children reach teenage. 
Even if the family’s disposable income is constant over time (say smoothed by borrowing and 
lending in a perfect financial market), parents have responsibility to support their children under 
age 18. As the children grow up, the resource that is available per child under age 18 will in-
crease over time. Either way, parents may have more resources to transfer to younger children 
than to older children, if the children are compared at the same age. We refer to both scenarios as 
resource dilution.    19
What does resource dilution mean for children’s risky behavior and parental transfers? It 
depends on the pattern of the parent-child interaction. By the unitary model, parents can always 
persuade the children to undertake behaviors that are of the best interests for the family. This im-
plies no birth-order effect in the children’s behavior, although parental transfers may differ by 
birth order for the reasons stated above.
20 This is clearly different from the birth-order effects of 
children behaviors predicted by the reputation model.  
  Becker’s model of parent-child conflict does not imply birth-order effects either, unless 
we impose financial constraints. As described in Section 2, imposing financial constraints on the 
Becker’s model may lead to two types of birth-order effects. In a world of transferable utilities 
(i.e. the parent is unforgiving and this is publicly known), the parent has more resources for 
younger children and therefore is less constrained in designing an optimal incentive for the 
younger children to behave as the parent desires. In our context, this implies that younger chil-
dren behave better than the older children, which is opposite to the prediction from the reputation 
model. Alternatively, in a world of non-transferable utilities (i.e the parent is forgiving and this is 
publicly known), parents may be equally forgiving for every child’s risk-taking behavior but they 
are tied up in resources to help out the older children. In equilibrium, older children expect the re-
source shortage ex ante and therefore are less likely to engage in risky behaviors.  
  The birth-order effects implied by the second scenario under the non-transferable utility 
assumption are similar to those from the reputation model with two distinctions. First, unless the 
adolescent risky behavior generates a greater demand for financial transfers at the adult age, the 
birth-order effects implied by resource dilution should apply to both ill-behaving and well-
behaving children. In contrast, parental punishment out of reputation concerns only applies to the 
                                                 
20 Another possibility is that parents prefer the younger children to behave worse than the older children, which we 
think is unlikely to hold in reality.    20
children that have engaged in some risky behaviors in adolescence. The second distinction lies in 
difference between low- and high-income families. Under the resource dilution argument, the 
birth-order effects should only exist when the financial constraints are sometimes binding. In 
other words, if family income is sufficiently high such that those constraints are never binding, 
we should not observe any birth-order effect. This implies no birth-order effects for high-income 
families. In contrast, under the reputation model, the punishment of risky behavior should be 
sensitive to birth order for all levels of family income. In fact, high-income parents (who are 
most likely well educated) may have stronger preferences against teen risky behaviors, either be-
cause they are more concerned about losing face with an ill-behaving child or because they place 
higher value on education. If so, children from the high-income family would hold a stronger 
prior belief that their parents are unforgiving. In the reputation model, a strong prior implies that 
high-income parents have stronger incentives to maintain the reputation of “being tough.” In 
short, a comparison of high-income and low-income families should draw a clear distinction be-
tween the two competing explanations.  
5.  Data 
  This study uses data from the 1979 to 1994 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 consists of a nationally representative sample of youth in 
the U.S. between the ages of 14 to 21 in 1979. As noted above, our transfer analysis is able to 
take advantage of the full sample of NLSY79,
21 while the behavior analysis has to be restricted 
to the subset of the respondents in the NLSY79 who have at least one sibling in the sample in or-
der to specify the family fixed effects. Since teenage childbearing behavior only applies to fe-
male respondents, the study of teenage childbearing is further limited to females only. 
                                                 
21 For a complete description of this survey, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001).   21
  The NLSY79 sample design selected all respondents between the ages 14 and 21 (by 
January 1, 1979) who resided in surveyed households that were drawn in 1978. Of the 11,323 ci-
vilian respondents originally included in NLSY79 with non-missing transfer values, the multiple-
sibling sample consists of 5,569 respondents for the analysis of high school dropout. For the 
analysis of teenage childbearing, the full sample contains 4,926 females, 1,524 of which have at 
least one sister interviewed in NLSY79.
22 
  The NLSY79 Survey gathered an extensive set of data on its respondents in its 1979 
baseline interview and in subsequent annual interviews through 1994. Included in this data are 
detailed education histories for all respondents, fertility histories for female respondents, as well 
as information about two forms of parental transfers beyond the age 18 to be described below. 
We also make use of a rich set of personal and family background characteristics gathered in the 
NLSY79 annual surveys. 
  The indicator of high school dropout is defined as not having a high school diploma be-
fore age 20. The teen birth indicator is defined to be equal to 1 if a female respondent had a live 
birth prior to age 18. Based on these definitions, we estimate the risky behavior specification us-
ing one observation per individual and measure the time-varying variables at the age of the oc-
currence of the risky behavior or at age 18 if no occurrence of risky behavior. 
  We measure two alternative forms of parental transfers. The first form is financial trans-
fer, a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a respondent’s parents provided at least 50 per-
cent of the annual expenses after age 18. The second form is co-residence transfer, a dichoto-
mous variable, indicating whether the respondent was living in the parents’ home. 
  The reputation model draws attention to three key variables. In section 3, we have de-
                                                 
22 The NLSY79 also included a supplementary sample of civilians who were in the military at the time the sample 
was drawn. None of the respondents in this supplementary sample had information on siblings so they were not in-  22
fined NYG to be the number of siblings (sisters) under age 18 at the risk of high school dropout 
(teenage childbearing). The second variable, AGAP, is defined as the age gap in years between 
the respondent and the next younger sibling (sister) at risk in the behavior equation. To incorpo-
rate the timing of transfers, in the transfer equation, AGAP is defined as the number of years 
since the study year to the year of the next younger sibling growing up to age 18. To distinguish 
low-income and high-income families, we define the third variable, HIGHINC, in two steps. 
First, from each household’s 1978 income, we calculate income per capita counting in all chil-
dren and parents. This calculation includes any new child born by 1993 when the detailed sibling 
information was collected, thus capturing the lowest income per capita that would possibly occur 
in the family. Second, we label a family “high income” (i.e., HIGHINC = 1) if its annual income 
per capita is over $3,000.
23 By definition, NYG and AGAP are time varying but HIGHINC is 
time-invariant. 
  Besides the three key variables, we control for three sets of variables describing individ-
ual, family and community characteristics. The first set captures parent preferences or tastes, in-
cluding parental age, parental education, family structure, and welfare receipt, some of which are 
constant within families. The second set measures offspring characteristics including age, race, 
ability, and psychological states, some of which are constant within individuals. The third set of 
variables describing the community conditions captures the economic and social environment 
within which children and parents make decisions. These include central city, proportion of 
county black population, proportion of county poor population, and AFDC guarantee levels and 
employment growth rates in the state of residence. 
                                                                                                                                                             
cluded in our samples. 
23 We choose $3,000 per capita as the criteria for high income because the official poverty threshold for a family of 
3 in 1980 is $6,565 and about $2,200 per capita. Taken inflation into account, an income of $3,000 per capita could 
be considered rather well-off.   23
6.  Results 
  This section begins with summarizing the distribution of the three key variables-parental 
transfers, risky behaviors, and the number of siblings at risk. To facilitate a comparison between 
the reputation model and the alternative explanation of resource diluting, we report two sets of 
summary statistics, one for all families and the other for high-income families only. Section 6.2 
presents multivariate analyses for parents’ transfer decisions and children’s behavior decisions, 
both allowing formal econometric tests for the two potential explanations. 
6.1  Summary of Key Variables 
6.1.1 Parental Transfers 
  Table 1 reports the proportion of offspring that receive co-residence or financial transfers 
from parents when over age 18. The proportions are grouped by whether the offspring have en-
gaged in a certain risky behavior as teens, by family income level, and by the number of siblings 
remaining at risk when parents make transfer decisions. Panel A focuses on high school dropout 
status and Panel B focuses on teenage childbearing. 
  The first three rows of Panel A show that parents tend to withhold financial transfers 
from high school dropouts but are equally likely to make co-residence transfers to all children. In 
particular, for all families, 19% of high school dropouts receive financial transfers from parents 
at ages older than 19. The corresponding figure is 24% for offspring who did not drop out of 
high school. Thus, the average “punishment” for high school dropout is a 5% decline in the like-
lihood of getting financial help from parents. 
  The reputation model predicts that these punishments should increase with the number of 
siblings at risk. Towards the bottom of Panel A (under “(1) Minus (2)”), we display how pun-
ishments change with the number of siblings under the age of 18. As expected, for all families,   24
going from 0 to 1 sibling at risk increases the dropout penalty in the form of co-residence trans-
fers from 0% to 6%. Similarly, the penalty in the form of financial transfer increases from 4% to 
9%. 
  Such effect is more apparent with high-income families. For high-income families only, 
the penalty in term of co-residence transfer increases from 0% for 0 sibling at risk to 6% for 1 
sibling at risk, and the penalty in term of financial transfers increases from 2% to 7%. When we 
increase the number of siblings to 2 or 3+, high-income families indicate a clearly monotone in-
crease in penalty, although all families as a whole do not show a clear pattern. This is opposite to 
the resource dilution argument, which predicts that the birth-order effect, if it exists, should only 
apply to low-income families. 
  Panel B of Table 1 reports corresponding statistics for teenage childbearing. The basic 
pattern remains similar except that parents appear to respond to teenage childbearing more 
strongly. Parents are less likely to make transfers (coresidence or financial) to a daughter who 
was a teen mother than otherwise in both low- and high-income families. Consistent with the 
reputation model, going from 0 to 1 sisters under 18 increases the penalty in the form of co-
residence transfers from 5% to 15% for all families and from 7% to 13% for high-income fami-
lies. When the numbers of sisters at risk increases from 1 to 2 or 3+, such birth-order effects be-
come stronger for high-income families than for all families. Again, this statistic supports the 
reputation model but contradicts the alternative explanation of resource diluting. 
6.1.2 Offspring Behaviors 
  Table 2 presents the proportions of offspring who dropped out of high school or gave 
birth as a teen by the number of siblings remaining at risk. Panel A report both behaviors condi-
tional on the full sample while Panel B focuses on the subset of the respondents who have at   25
least one sibling in the sample. Results are similar across the two panels. 
  Two phenomena stand out from Table 2. First, by our reputation model, we expect the 
proportion of offspring engaging in dropouts (teen childbearing) to decrease with the number of 
siblings (sisters) at risk. This pattern does not show up when we pool all families. For all fami-
lies, the incidence of risky behaviors is substantially higher for offspring (daughters) with 3+ 
younger siblings (sister) than those with a small number of younger siblings (sisters), although 
the difference across having 0, 1, or 2 siblings (sisters) at risk is much smaller. As shown later, 
this counterintuitive phenomenon can be attributed to observable and unobservable differences 
across families. 
  More striking is the difference between all families and high-income families. For high-
income families, the incidence of risky behaviors is moderately lower for offspring (daughters) 
with at least three younger siblings (sisters) than other categories, as we would predict from the 
reputation model. This phenomenon is inconsistent with the resource dilution argument. 
6.2  Full Results 
  We now turn to the multivariate analysis. Table 3 reports individual-fixed-effects esti-
mates for parents’ transfer decisions conditional on offspring teenage risky behaviors. Table 4 
reports family-fixed-effects estimates for offspring decisions in whether to engage in high school 
dropout or teenage childbearing. In both tables, we control for observed individual, family and 
community characteristics in addition to individual or family fixed effects. Due to space limit, 
we present only those parameters that are the most relevant for the reputation model and the al-
ternative explanations. 
6.2.1 Parental Transfers 
  Using the sample of all offspring, Panel A of Table 3 estimates the parent transfer deci-  26
sion for each offspring in each year beyond age 19 as a function of the offspring’s high school 
dropout status. In comparison, Panel B models the parent transfer decision for each daughter in 
each year beyond age 18 as a function of the daughter’s teenage childbearing status, using the 
sample of all daughters. Both panels report the results for co-residence and financial transfers in 
parallel. As described below, each form of transfers involves three incremental models. 
  Model 1 tests the main reputation effect, which predicts that the greater the number of 
siblings (sisters) under the age of 18, the less likely is an offspring with a high school dropout 
status (a daughter with teenage childbearing) to receive co-residence and financial transfers from 
parents. We test the hypothesis by the interaction between high school dropout status (teenage 
childbearing) and the number of siblings (sisters) under 18 (B·NYG). As predicted, the coefficient 
of this interaction is negative and significant for co-residence and financial transfers concerning 
both high school dropout and teenage childbearing. The robustness of the finding lends strong 
support for the reputation model. Moreover, the coefficient of NYG is positive, suggesting that 
pooling families of all income levels, parents on average give more transfers to older adult chil-
dren if these children did not engage in risky behaviors during teen years. This contradicts the re-
source dilution story that predicts that parents should face more financial constraint when they 
have more children under age 18 and therefore transfer less to older children. 
  Model 2 tests the reputation implication concerning the discount factor captured by the 
interaction between risky behavior and the age-gap between the offspring and its next younger 
sibling at risk (B·AGAP). According to the reputation model, a larger age gap implies fewer repu-
tation gains in the future and therefore less punitive reactions from parents. We find support for 
this prediction in the co-residence transfer analysis conditional on daughter teenage childbearing 
status (the column of co-residence transfers in Panel B). In particular, parents are less likely to   27
withhold coresidence transfers to a daughter with teen birth if the daughter is far apart in age 
from the next sister at risk. In comparison, financial transfers to teen mothers do not differ by age 
gap. For high school dropout, neither co-residence nor financial transfers are sensitive to age 
gap, indicating that age gap may not fully capture the way parents discount the future. 
  It is worth emphasizing that the basic reputation effect, captured by B·NYG, remains sig-
nificant in Model 2 for both types of transfers and both types of behaviors. This uniform finding 
is the most basic and compelling evidence in favor of the reputation model. 
  Model 3 tests the resource dilution argument by introducing two new variables. One is 
the interaction of the number of siblings at risk and an indicator of high per capita family income 
(NYG·HIGHINC), and the other is a three-way interaction of B·NYG·HIGHINC. Because the re-
source dilution argument only applies to low-income families and does not necessarily depend 
on the teenage behaviors of offspring, we expect the birth-order effects to be reflected in a nega-
tive coefficient of NYG and a positive coefficient of NYG·HIGHINC. Results are consistent with 
this prediction, suggesting that budget constraints may indeed create some birth order effects in 
low-income families. 
  However, the coefficient of B·NYG in model 3 remains negative and significant, implying 
the birth order effects to be much stronger for ill-behaving offspring than for behaving offspring. 
For the resource dilution story to explain this phenomenon, we must believe that engagement in 
teenage risky behaviors entails greater demand for parental transfers and parents are responding 
to such demand. In that case, the income story should still be restricted to low-income families, 
implying a positive coefficient on B·NYG·HIGHINC. In contrast to this prediction, we find nega-
tive and significant coefficient for B·NYG·HIGHINC, for both transfers and both risky behaviors. 
This implies that the behavior-specific birth order effect is even stronger for high-income fami-  28
lies, which lead us to reject the income story. On the other hand, the persistent negative, signifi-
cant coefficient for B·NYG throughout Models 1-3 provides strong evidence to support our repu-
tation model. 
6.2.2 Offspring Behavior 
  Table 4 reports results on offspring behavior in two panels—Panel A for high school 
dropout, and Panel B for teenage childbearing. All parameters are estimated with family fixed ef-
fects. As in Table 3, we present selected estimates from three incremental models. 
  Model 1 tests the reputation model, which predicts that the greater the number of siblings 
(sisters) under 18, the less likely for an offspring (daughter) to exhibit a risky behavior. For high 
school dropout status, the coefficient of the number of siblings under 18 (NYG) is negative and 
significant, lending strong support for this prediction. For teenage childbearing status, the coeffi-
cient for the number of sisters younger than 18 is negative, but the size of standard errors is more 
than doubled. This may be because the analysis of teenage childbearing is limited to females and 
therefore we do not have enough observations for the sample of multiple sisters. Nevertheless, 
the consistent negative signs of NYG in both panels support the reputation model. 
  Model 2 tests the reputation implication concerning the discounting factor. In particular, 
the model predicts that offspring facing wider age gap with the next younger sibling should be 
more likely to engage in risky behaviors. For both behaviors, the coefficients on AGAP are in-
significant from zero. Given the weak results on age gap in the transfer regressions, this suggests 
that our definition of age gap may not fully capture parents’ value of the future. However, the 
main reputation effect remains robust even after we control for AGAP, which provides further 
support for the reputation model. 
  Finally, Model 3 tests the resource dilution argument by adding in an interaction of the   29
number of siblings (sisters) under age 18 and the binary indicator of high-income families 
(NYG·HIGHINC). A similar birth order effect may arise from the resource dilution story if en-
gagement in risky behaviors calls for more parental help and children of higher birth order ra-
tionally expect less parental transfers due to more binding financial constraints. In that case, we 
should only observe the birth order effect for low-income families, as the financial constraints 
are likely to bind in low-income families. Opposite to this prediction, Model 4 finds that off-
spring from high- and low-income families respond to the foreseen parental penalty in statisti-
cally the same manner. Based on this finding and the negative coefficients for NYG throughout 
all three models, we believe the data is more supportive of the reputation model than of the re-
source dilution story. 
7.  Conclusion 
  This paper introduces a new perspective to understand intra-familial interaction and its 
impact on teenage risky behaviors. Drawing on a literature from industrial organization, we lay-
out a reputation model and predict that parents have, under some conditions, the incentive to 
punish older children for their risky behaviors in order to dissuade younger children from the 
same risky behaviors. 
  The reputation model generates two empirical implications: the likelihood of teenage 
risky behaviors and parental transfers to children who engaged in risky behaviors during teen 
years will decrease with the number of siblings under age 18. At least in the context of high 
school dropout and teenage childbearing, we find support for both implications. We also con-
sider an alternative resource dilution story in which parents may have more resources per capita 
to transfer when they have fewer children under 18. Empirical evidence suggests that the reputa-
tion model is far more powerful than the alternative income story in explaining the real data.   30
  To be sure, there are a variety of other factors that influence the risk-taking behaviors of 
adolescents. As noted in the Introduction, there is evidence that community, school and public 
policies may have important impacts on teenage behaviors as well. In complement, our analysis 
suggests that parents alone, as the main authority of adolescents, may have some ability to con-
trol at least some adolescents’ risky behaviors.  
  Understanding the role of parents may help policymakers in two aspects: first, it may 
help identify the circumstances under which parents are less able to discipline teenagers thus 
helping policymakers design social policies to remedy the parents’ failure. Reputation model 
suggests that, within the same family, forgiving parents may have less control on later-born chil-
dren. Reputation model also provides a potential link between declining family size over time
24 
and more spoiled children today than generations ago.
25  
  In the second aspect, our study may help formulate social policies that strengthen the pa-
rental control over adolescents. For example, the reputation model suggests that a stronger prior 
of parents being unforgiving give parents more incentives to maintain the reputation of “being 
tough.” Specifically, a family with stronger prior will classify more children in Regime 1 where 
parents punish wrongdoing with probability one. The expectation of parental punishment will de-
ter adolescent children from risky behaviors. If social policies such as school education and 
community efforts can reinforce the prior belief (of parents being unforgiving), these policies 
                                                 
24 Family size has dropped significantly over the last 20 to 40 years. Today, the typical woman in the U.S. is ex-
pected to have 2.03 children over her lifetime. In 1970, the corresponding figure was 2.5 children and in 1960 it was 
3.6 children. Source: Period-specific total fertility rate estimates taken from selected issues of National Vital Statis-
tics Reports, Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Center of Disease Control and Prevention. 
25 An article in the August 6, 2001 issue of Time magazine entitled, “Who’s in Charge Here?” reported that 80 per-
cent of American adults think that today’s children are more spoiled than kids of 10 or 15 years ago were. The arti-
cle goes on to lament that today’s youth are the most indulged generation in recent history: “Go to the mall or a con-
cert or a restaurant and you can find them in the wild, the kids who have never been told no, whose sense of power 
and entitlement leaves onlookers breathless, the sand-kicking, foot-stomping, arm-twisting wheedling, whining des-
pots whose parents presumably deserve the monsters they, after all, have created.”   31
may help parents discipline their adolescent children.    32
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Table 1:  Parental Transfers by Offspring’s Risky Behaviors, Number of Younger Sibling 
Daughters) under Age 18, and per Capita Income in the Family 
 
Panel A.  By Offspring’s High School Dropout Behavior 
 
 Co-Residence  Transfer Financial  Transfer 
 All  Families  High per Capita 
Income Families  All Families  High per Capita 
Income Families 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
HS Dropout Status:              
Not HS Dropout  0.22  101,985  0.23  29,235  0.24  51,760  0.27  13,917 
High School Dropout  0.22  42,773  0.22  5,493  0.19  21,482  0.24  2,578 
Average 0.22  144,758  0.23  34,728  0.23  73,242  0.27  16,495 
                   
(1) High School Dropouts                   
No. of Sibs Younger than 18                   
0 0.19  25,233  0.20  3,757  0.18  9,485  0.23  1,553 
1 0.30  5,483  0.35  819  0.20  3,639  0.28  587 
2 0.32  2,459  0.37  182  0.21  1,961  0.25  152 
3+ 0.33  1,812  0.37  52  0.20  1,581  0.14  42 
Missing 0.25  7,786  0.16  683  0.20  4,816  0.17  244 
                   
(2) Not High School Dropouts                    
No. of Sibs Younger than 18                   
0 0.19  63,711  0.20  20,439  0.22  25,703  0.25  8,633 
1 0.36  12,190  0.41  3,466  0.29  9,159  0.35  2,780 
2 0.37  4,012  0.46  755  0.27  3,367  0.35  658 
3+ 0.40  2,206  0.53  209  0.26  1,988  0.39  190 
Missing 0.21  19,866  0.18  4,366  0.22  11,543  0.24  1,656 
                   
(1) Minus (2)                   
No. of Sibs Younger than 18                   
0 0.00    0.00    -0.04    -0.02   
1 -0.06    -0.06    -0.09    -0.07   
2 -0.05    -0.09    -0.06    -0.10   
3+ -0.07    -0.16    -0.06    -0.25   
Notes:   Sampling weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations. 
 Sample: Sample of all offspring from the NLSY79 data set.   38
Table 1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  By Daughter’s Teenage Childbearing Behavior 
 
  Co-Residence Transfer  Financial Transfer 
 All  Families  High per Capita 
Income Families  All Families  High per Capita 
Income Families 
 Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Teen Birth Status:          
  No Teen Birth  0.19  59,328  0.20  16,714  0.24  28,545  0.28  7,885 
  Teen Birth  0.12  8,835  0.12  817  0.11  4,239  0.15  371 
  Average  0.18  68,163  0.20  17,531  0.23  32,784  0.28  8,256 
                   
(1) Teen Birth                   
No. of Sisters Younger than 18                   
0 0.12  6,819  0.12  722  0.11  2,812  0.15  312 
1 0.16  1,040  0.23  53  0.09  756  0.07  40 
2 0.16  354  0.09  9  0.13  277  0.14  5 
3+ 0.19  171  0.00  2  0.13  156  0.00  2 
Missing 0.08  451  0.00  31  0.17  238  0.28  12 
                   
(2) No Teen Birth                   
No. of Sisters Younger than 18                   
0 0.17  47,381  0.19  14,248  0.24  20,381  0.27  6,425 
1 0.31  5,605  0.36  1,179  0.26  4,310  0.34  891 
2 0.35  1,210  0.42  201  0.26  1,065  0.34  176 
3+ 0.32  362  0.7  19  0.26  317  0.64  17 
Missing 0.21  4,770  0.14  1,067  0.23  2,472  0.20  376 
                   
(1) Minus (2)                   
No. of Sisters Younger than 18                   
0 -0.05    -0.07    -0.13    -0.12   
1 -0.15    -0.13    -0.17    -0.28   
2 -0.19    -0.33    -0.13    -0.20   
3+ -0.13    -0.77    -0.13    -0.64   
 Notes:   Sampling weights were used to reproduce the population distribution of means and standard deviations. 
 Sample: Sample of all daughters in NLSY79 data set. 
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Table 2:  Offspring’s Risky Behaviors by Number of Siblings (Daughters) under Age 18 
and per Capita Income in the Family 
 
Panel A.  All Offspring (Daughters) Sample 
 
High School Dropout Teen  Birth 
All Families  High per Cap. 
Inc. Families  All Families  High per Cap. 
Inc. Families 
No. of Siblings  
(Daughters) under 18
Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
0 0.22  3,329  0.16  1,086  0.09  2,658  0.04  847 
1 0.21  2,540  0.15  825  0.08  1,208  0.03  297 
2 0.25  1,536  0.17  338  0.12  427  0.03  64 
3+ 0.34  1,397  0.15  128  0.18  193  0.00  10 
Missing 0.23  2,526  0.14  89  0.05  440  0.00  12 
Total 0.24  11,328  0.15  2,466  0.09  4,926  0.04  1,230 
Notes:  Sample for High School Dropout Behavior: Sample of all offspring in NLSY79 data set. 
  Sample for Teenage Childbearing Behavior: Sample of all daughters in NLSY79 data set. 
 
Panel B.  Multiple Offspring (Daughters) Sample 
 
High School Dropout Teen  Birth 
All Families  High per Cap. 
Inc. Households All Families  High per Cap. 
Inc. Families 
No. of Siblings  
(Daughters) under 18
Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N 
0 0.20  1,400  0.14  484  0.08  622  0.05  184 
1 0.18  1,501  0.12  512  0.06  480  0.02  131 
2 0.21  944  0.14  201  0.06  209  0.01  39 
3+ 0.30  849  0.13  89  0.15  72  0.00  6 
Missing 0.23  875  0.16  63  0.02  141  0.00  8 
Total 0.21  5,569  0.13  1,349  0.07  1,524  0.03  368 
Notes:  Sample for High School Dropout Behavior: Families with 2-4 children (siblings) in NLSY79 data set. 
  Sample for Teenage Childbearing Behavior: Families with 2-4 daughters (sisters) in NLSY79 data set. 
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Table 3:  Determinants of Parental Transfers 
 
Panel A.  As Function of Offspring’s High School Dropout Status 
 
Co-Residence Transfer Financial  Transfer  Variable 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
No. of Siblings Younger than 18  (NYG)  .0174*** .0050 .0001 .0081**  -.0046  -.0127** 
  (.0023) (.0035) (.0035) (.0040) (.0058) (.0059) 
Missing Younger Sibs Data  -.0333*** -.0249***  -.0093  -.0393*** -.0223  -.0065 
  (.0086) (.0090) (.0090) (.0138) (.0145) (.0146) 
HS Dropout × No. of Younger Siblings  (B × NYG)  -.0446*** -.0433*** -.0348*** -.0556*** -.0531*** -.0400***
    (.0033) (.0036) (.0037) (.0058) (.0059) (.0062) 
Age Gap with Next Oldest Sibling   (AGAP)   -.0037***  -.0033***  -.0010  -.0009 
   (.0008)  (.0008)   (.0014)  (.0014) 
Missing Siblings’ Age Gap Data    -.0518***  -.0358***   -.0375*** -.0245* 
   (.0097)  (.0098)   (.0141)  (.0143) 
High School Dropout × Age Gap of Siblings (B × GAP)    .0001 .0008   .0002 .0013 
     (.0008)  (.0008)   (.0015)  (.0015) 
No. of Younger Sibs × High per Cap. Income Family     .0785***   .0843***
    (> $3,000) (NYG * HIGHINC)     (.0058)     (.0094) 
HS Dropout × No. of Younger Sibs × High per Cap.     -.0589***    -.0977***
    Income Family (> $3,000)   (B × NYG × HIGHINC)     (.0132)     (.0223) 
Number of Person-Years  144,758  144,758  144,758   73,242   73,242   73,242 
Number of Individuals    11,269    11,269    11,269   11,184   11,184   11,184 
R-squared          .23          .23          .23         .11         .11         .11 
Notes:   The sample consists of all offspring in NLSY79 data set.  Measurement of dependent Variables: Co-Residence Transfer = 1 if the respondent lives with parents, 
  = 0 otherwise.  Financial transfer = 1 if parents provide at least half of living expenses, = 0 otherwise. 
  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   41
Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B.  As Function of Daughter’s Teenage Childbearing Status 
 
Co-Residence Transfer Financial  Transfer  Variable 
1  2 3 1  2  3 
No. of Sisters Younger Than 18  (NYG) .0268***  .0283***  .0231*** .0215*** .0291**  .0201 
  (.0040)  (.0072) (.0072) (.0071) (.0126)  (.0127) 
Missing Younger Sisters Data  -.0057  -.0091  .0308*  -.0060  -.0031  .0250 
  (.0153)  (.0155) (.0159) (.0262) (.0267)  (.0272) 
Teen Birth × No. of Younger Sisters  (B × NYG)  -.0961*** -.1085***  -.0955*** -.1031*** -.1028*** -.0881***
    (.0079)  (.0091) (.0092) (.0147) (.0152)  (.0156) 
Age Gap with Next Oldest Sister  (AGAP)   -.0044***  -.0032***   .0039*  .0040* 
   (.0012)  (.0012)    (.0023)  (.0023) 
Missing Sisters’ Age Gap Data    -.0234  -.0017    .0261  .0344 
   (.0153)  (.0154)    (.0242)  (.0243) 
Teen Birth × Age Gap of Sisters  (B × AGAP)   .0045***  .0047***   -.0004  .0005 
     (.0017)  (.0017)    (.0031)  (.0031) 
No. of Younger Sisters × High per Cap. Income Family      .1200***    .0911***
 (> $3,000) (NYG * HIGHINC)     (.0105)      (.0172) 
Teen Birth × No. of Younger Sisters × High per Cap.     -.1058**      -.1541* 
  Income Family (> $3,000)  (B × NYG × HIGHINC)     (.0493)      (.0795) 
Number of Person-Years   71,332   71,332   71,332   35,902   35,902   35,902 
Number of Individuals     4,908     4,908     4,908     4,878     4,878     4,878 
R-squared         .28         .28         .28         .14         .14         .14 
Notes:   The sample consists of all daughters in NLSY79 data set.   Measurement of dependent Variables: Co-Residence Transfer = 1 if the respondent lives with parents,  
  = 0 otherwise.  Financial transfer = 1 if parents provide at least half of living expenses, = 0 otherwise. 
  * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4:  Determinants of Risky Behaviors of Offspring (Daughters) 
 
Panel A.  Offspring’s High School Dropout Decision 
 
Variable 1  2  3 
No. of Siblings Younger than 18  (NYG)  -.0251*** -.0292*** -.0290*** 
    (.0094) (.0108) (.0109) 
Missing Younger Sibs Data  .0060  .0089  .0088 
  (.0255) (.0269) (.0269) 
Age Gap with Next Oldest Sibling  (AGAP)   -.0032  -.0032 
   (.0045)  (.0045) 
Missing Siblings’ Age Gap Data    -.0255  -.0265 
   (.0297)  (.0302) 
No. of Younger Siblings × High per Capita Income      -.0037 
   Family (> $3,000)  (NYG × HIGHINC)     (.0205) 
Notes: The sample consists of offspring in families with 2-4 offspring in NLSY79 data set. 
 
 
Panel B.  Daughter’s Teenage Childbearing Decision 
 
Variable  1 2 3 
No. of Sisters Younger Than 18  (NYG)  -.0147 -.0102 -.0081 
    (.0216) (.0271) (.0272) 
Missing Younger Sisters Data  -.0846**  -.0938**  -.0933** 
  (.0426) (.0433) (.0433) 
Age Gap with Next Oldest Sister   (AGAP)   -.0086  -.0089 
   (.0068)  (.0068) 
Missing Sisters’ Age Gap Data    -.0115  -.0209 
   (.0485)  (.0494) 
No. of Younger Sisters × High per Capita Income      -.0395 
   Family (> $3,000) (NYG × HIGHINC)     (.0386) 
Notes: The sample includes daughters in families with 2-4 daughters in NLSY79 data set 
 